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Akiachak Native Community v. Salazar, 935 F. Supp. 2d 195 
(D.D.C. 2013) 
Land Acquisition in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 
(Dec. 23, 2014) 
 
Wesley J. Furlong 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Akiachak Native Community v. Salazar1 and the BIA’s repeal of 
the Alaska Exception2 are set to mark sweeping changes for Alaska 
Natives. Following the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia’s holding that the prohibition of trust acquisitions in 
Alaska violates the IRA, and before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit could issue an opinion on the merits, 
the BIA repealed its rule prohibiting such acquisitions. The 
potential for drastic changes to the landscape of native 
communities and villages in Alaska is highly likely. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Section five of the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 
passed in 1934, grants the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) 
the authority to take land into trust “for the purpose of providing 
lands for Indians.” 3  Originally, the IRA excluded Alaska and 
Alaska Natives from its ambit. 4  In 1936, the Secretary was 
conferred the authority to take land into trust and to establish 
reservations in Alaska.5 In the 1970s, Congress passed legislation 
extinguishing title to land for Native Alaskans, reorganizing 
Alaska Native Communities and Villages into Native 
Corporations, terminating all Alaska Native land claims against the 
United States and the state, and eliminating the Secretary’s 
authority to create reservations in Alaska. 6  Following this 
legislation, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”), through the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), promulgated new regulations 
detailing the extent of the Secretary’s authority to take land into 
                                                 
1
 Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Salazar, 935 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2013) 
[hereinafter Akiachak I]. 
2
 Land Acquisition in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (Dec. 22, 2014). 
3
 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012). 
4
 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 4.04[3][a][i], 257 (Neil Jessup 
Newton, ed. 2015). 
5
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (citing Act of May 1, 1936 §§ 1-2, 49 Stat. 
1250, 1250-51 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473a (2012))). 
6
 See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 
(1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-29h (2012)); see also Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).  
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trust for Alaska Natives under 25 U.S.C. § 465.7 In establishing the 
“Alaska Exception” the BIA amended 25 C.F.R. § 151.1, stating 
that the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust did “not cover 
the acquisition of land in trust status in the State of Alaska, except 
acquisitions for the Metlakatla Indian Community of the Annette 
Island Reservation.” 8  The plaintiffs in Akiachak challenged the 
Secretary’s findings that the trust acquisition authority was 
repealed by Congress and also argued the Alaska Exception 
violated the IRA.9 On May 1, 2014, following the district court’s 
opinion that struck down the Alaska Exception, the BIA issued a 
rule change announcement proposing to remove the Alaska 
Exception from § 151.1 and opened a comment period.10  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  
 In a 1978 memorandum, the Associate Solicitor for the 
Division of Indian Affairs found that the passage of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)11 repealed much of the 
IRA’s applicability in Alaska, specifically removing the trust status 
of land and prohibiting claims settlements from being apportioned 
to Alaska Natives in trust.12 The memorandum found that it would 
be an abuse of discretion to take land into trust for Alaska 
Natives.13 A 2001 BIA memorandum rescinded the 1978 findings 
and found that the ANCSA did not specifically repeal section five 
of the IRA.14 The same day as the memorandum’s publication, the 
BIA issued final rules amending § 151.1, leaving intact the Alaska 
Exception.15 While the BIA stated it would “‘consider the legal 
and policy issues involved in . . . remov[ing] the prohibition,’” the 
regulation was never changed.16 
 
The Alaska Exception was challenged in Akiachak by four 
Alaska Native tribes and one individual.17 They alleged the Alaska 
Exception was an abuse of discretion by the Secretary because the 
                                                 
7
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 200-01.  
8
 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2014), amended by 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (effective Jan. 22, 
2015).  
9
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
10
 Land Acquisition in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 24648 (May 1, 2014). 
11
 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889; Akiachak I recognized the FLPMA also repealed 
sections of the IRA applicable to Alaska. 935 F. Supp. 2d at 198-200 (see infra 
note 32; see also supra note 6). 
12
 79 Fed. Reg. 76888. 
13
 Id.  
14
 Id.  
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. (quoting Acquisition of Title to Land in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 3452, 3454 
(Jan. 16, 2001)). 
17
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
Akiachak Native Community v. Salazar 
Page 3 of 7 
ANCSA and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”) did not repeal the Secretary’s authority to take land 
into trust in Alaska.18 The plaintiffs also argued that the Alaska 
Exception violated the IRA, specifically 25 U.S.C. § 476(g).19 
 
Any regulation or administrative decision . . . that 
classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges 
and immunities available to a federally recognized 
Indian tribe relative to the privileges and 
immunities available to other federally recognized 
tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes shall 
have no effect.20 
 
The State of Alaska intervened on behalf of the Secretary.21 On a 
motion for summary judgement, the district court ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs on both issues.22 The district court granted a stay in 
part as the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 23  The DOI 
subsequently moved to drop its appeal, and a decision from the 
D.C. Circuit on Alaska’s appeal is pending.24 
 
Following the district court’s opinion in Akiachak, on May 
1, 2014 the BIA issued a proposed rule change repealing the 
Alaska Exception due to “urgent policy recommendations.”25 After 
a sixty-day comment period and public meetings, the BIA issued 
its final rule repealing the Alaska Exception on December 23, 
2014.26 While the amended language of § 151.1 took effect on 
January 22, 2015, implementation of the amendment is stayed.27 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  
A. The Legality of the Alaska Exception 
 
 The central issue in Akiachak was whether the ANCSA and 
the FLPMA actually repealed the Secretary’s authority to take land 
                                                 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. at 209 (citing U.S.C. § 476(g) (2012)). 
20
 25 U.S.C. § 476(g) (emphasis added). 
21
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 n. 1 (D.D.C. 2014) 
[hereinafter Akiachak IV] (granting stay in part). 
24
 Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 13-5361, 2014 WL 
3014864 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 2014) [hereinafter Akiachak III] (dismissing 
appeal).  
25
 79 Fed. Reg. 24648. 
26
 Id.; 79 Fed. Reg. at 76890. 
27
 79 Fed. Reg. at 76888; Akiachak IV, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 18-19. 
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into trust pursuant to Section five of the IRA.28 If the Secretary 
was found to have retained his authority, the issue became whether 
the Alaska Exception violated 25 U.S.C. § 476(g).29  
 
 The court found that while the FLPMA repealed the 
Secretary’s authority to establish reservations in Alaska, 30  the 
ANCSA did not explicitly repeal the Secretary’s authority to take 
land into trust for Alaska Natives. 31  The court noted that the 
ANCSA extinguished “‘[a]ll claims against the United States . . . 
based on claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy.’”32 
The court stated, “a ‘claim’ is necessarily an assertion of [a] right” 
and trust petitions could not be construed as claims since the 
Secretary has the discretionary authority to grant or deny them.33 
 
 Additionally, the court found that language within the 
ANCSA, which established that “‘the settlement [of claims] should 
be accomplished . . . without creating a reservation system or 
lengthy wardship or trusteeship,’” would not be affected by the 
repeal of § 151.1.34 Alaska argued that the ANCSA, read together 
with the FLPMA, implicitly repealed the Secretary’s authority to 
take land into trust.35 The court noted that repeal of statutes “by 
implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the 
intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.”36  
 
The court ruled that Congress’s intent to rescind the 
Secretary’s trust acquisition authority was not “clear and 
manifest.” 37  Noting how “Congress felt the need to explicitly 
repeal the Secretary’s” authority to establish reservations, the 
absence of any explicit repeal of the Secretary’s trust acquisition 
authority was “a strong indication that the” authority still existed.38 
The court found that while the ANCSA prohibited land conveyed 
from claims settlements to be held in trust, it did not “prohibit[] the 
creation of any trusteeship outside of the settlement.”39 
 
                                                 
28
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 203 (citing Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743).  
31
 Id. at 207.  
32
 Id. at 204-05 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (2012)) (emphasis added, brackets 
in original). 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. at 206 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2012)).  
35
 Id. at 203-06. 
36
 Id. at 204 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 
U.S. 644, 622 (2007)) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
37
 Id. at 207. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id.  
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The district court next turned to whether § 151.1 was “‘in 
accordance with the law.’”40 The plaintiffs contended that § 151.1 
violated the IRA, specifically 25 U.S.C. § 476(g) which provides, 
“[a]ny regulation . . . diminish[ing] the privileges and immunities 
available to a federally recognized tribe” compared to those of 
others, simply “by virtue of their status as Indian tribes shall have 
no force of effect.” 41  The Secretary contended that Congress 
passed § 476(g) in an effort “‘to clarify . . . section 16 of the 
[IRA].’”42 The court found that “§ 476(g) plainly applies to ‘[a]ny 
regulation,’” and that “Congress commonly enacts statutes that 
address more than the precise concern.”43 
 
Additionally, the Secretary admitted the Alaska Exception 
diminishes the privileges of Alaska Natives, but argued that § 
476(g) only applies to discrimination between “‘similarly situated’ 
tribes.”44 Since Alaska Natives are not similarly situated to other 
tribes, the Secretary argued the Alaska Exception does not violate 
the IRA.45 However, the court pointed out that “similarly situated” 
appears nowhere in the statute, and when “‘the statute’s language 
is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to 
its terms.’” 46  The court found § 151.1 was an impermissible 
classification based purely on the tribal status of Alaska Natives.47 
The court denied the Secretary “substantial deference for [its] 
interpretation of [its] own regulation[s]”48  because the statute’s 
“‘language is plain and its meaning unambiguous,’”49 and ruled 
that “the Alaska exception [sic] is a regulation that diminished the 
privileges of non-Metlakatlan Alaska Natives relative to all other 
Indian tribes.”50 
 
B.  Repealing the Alaska Exception 
  
The BIA asserted that acquisition of trust lands provides a 
“physical space where tribal governments may exercise sovereign 
                                                 
40
 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)). 
41
 25 U.S.C. § 476(g). 
42
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. 11,234 (1994) 
(statement of Sen. John McCain)). 
43
 Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 476(g)). 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 210-11 (quoting U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
47
 Id. at 210. 
48
 Id. at 208 (quoting Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 
301, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
49
 Id. at 211 (quoting City of Hous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987)). 
50
 Id. at 210. 
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powers”51 and that trust acquisitions help assist in the furtherance 
of tribal self-governance and self-determination for Alaska Native 
tribes, which are “equally important” to Alaska Natives as they are 
to all other tribes.52 The BIA considered the effects on Alaskan 
native corporations’ sovereignty and self-governance, public safety 
in Alaska native communities, effects on economic development 
and resource management, and impacts on state and tribal 
jurisdiction. 53  The BIA stated that the repeal of the Alaska 
Exception would allow any “Alaska Native tribe or individual 
possessing fee title to alienable land, including ANCSA lands, [to] 
apply to have that land taken into trust.”54  
 
The BIA noted that it was the “[DOI]’s policy . . . that there 
should not be different classes of federally recognized tribes.”55 
The BIA found that “Alaska Native tribes and individuals have the 
right to decide for themselves whether to apply to have their land 
taken into trust.”56 The BIA stated that “[t]he Secretary’s authority 
to acquire land in trust” is “critical to carrying out the Federal trust 
responsibility” and “taking land into trust . . . is unlikely to have a 
negative effect on Alaska Native Corporations.”57 
  
The BIA’s reasoning followed a similar analysis as the 
district court in Akiachak. The BIA noted that while Congress 
explicitly granted the Secretary the authority to take land into trust 
in Alaska in 1936, it had “not passed any legislation that revoke[d] 
the Secretary’s authority to make trust land acquisitions in 
Alaska.” 58  The BIA emphasized that the ANCSA only 
extinguished existing title and claims, and limited the status of land 
transferred in any settlements.59 The BIA stressed that the ANCSA 
did not ever revoke the Secretary’s trust acquisition authority.60 
The BIA asserted there is no “‘irreconcilable conflict’” between 
the elimination of trust land by the ANCSA and the Secretary’s 
section five authority to acquire new trust land in Alaska.61 The 
BIA stated that that the “removal of the Alaska Exception [was] 
supported by both legal and public policy consideration.”62 
                                                 
51
 79 Fed. Reg. at 76895. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 76891-92. 
54
 Id. at 76894. 
55
 Id. at 76890. 
56
 Id. at 76891-92. 
57
 Id.   
58
 Id. at 76890. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id.; see Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 208. 
61
 Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 207 n. 8; 79 Fed. Reg. at 76890. 
62
 79 Fed. Reg. at 76895. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The BIA’s repeal of the Alaska Exception, and the district 
court’s finding that the prohibition is not in accordance with the 
law, signifies a significant shift in federal Indian law and policy in 
Alaska. There is potential for profound changes in the landscape 
for Alaska Natives and native corporations because the acquisition 
of trust lands in Alaska opens up benefits that were previously 
unavailable.63 As the BIA noted, the acquisition of trust land would 
allow native communities to better protect historical tribal land and 
establish a trust relationship with the federal government to ensure 
the lands’ protection.64 
 
The establishment of trust relationships in Alaska due to 
the impacts of this decision and rulemaking may prove to be an 
effective tool for Alaska native communities to combat the effects 
of climate change. In 2012, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed the Native Village of Kivalina’s suit against 
energy producers for their contribution to climate change and 
rising sea levels, because the Clean Air Act had replaced federal 
common law nuisance claims.65 Additionally, the establishment of 
trust lands in Alaska would implicitly override Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie Tribal Government, in which the Supreme Court 
effectively held that Indian country did not exist in Alaska.66  
 
 While the BIA’s repeal of the Alaska Exception would 
seem to make the issue of its legality moot before the D.C. Circuit, 
the court could find that the repeal of most of the IRA provisions 
applicable to Alaska by the ANCSA, read together with the 
FLPMA, did show clear congressional intent to repeal section five 
as it applied to Alaska as well. The BIA’s repeal of § 151.1 and the 
district court opinion in Akiachak announce a new era for Alaska 
Natives. While they represent potential for positive, seismic 
changes to Alaska native communities, the specter of an adverse 
ruling by the D.C. Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court, 
should, for the moment, temper any expectations the repeal of the 
Alaska Exception has created. 
                                                 
63
 79 Fed. Reg. at 76891.  
64
 Id. at 76891-92. 
65
 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
66
 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). It 
should be noted that Chief Justice Roberts successfully argued Venetie for the 
State of Alaska.  
